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INTRODUCTION

School finance litigation in the State of Washington has followed what
has become the usual pattern. The case of Northshore School District
No. 417 v. Kinnear was filed in April, 1972. Plaintiffs were twenty-five
school districts, plus a number of school children, parents, taxpayers, and
school directors. Defendants included the Treasurer of the State, the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Director of the State Department of Revenue, and members of the State Board of Education. The
complaint alleged that Washington's system of educational finance provided unequal educational opportunities to the school children in the
state, and that it also subjected taxpayers to discriminatory treatment.
The relief requested was a declaration that the system was unconstitutional; the court was also asked to retain jurisdiction of the cause for a
reasonable time to allow the legislature to correct the defects.'
The data on which plaintiffs' complaint rested were drawn from published reports of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Expecting
the accuracy and reliability 'of such data to be beyond dispute and the
likely subject of stipulation among the parties, plaintiffs filed their action
directly in the state supreme court under a rule permitting such a procedure.2 It was hoped that the case could thereby be presented without
delay on briefs to the supreme court. However, stipulation proved impossible. While the raw factual data were not disputed, their interpretation
could not be agreed upon. Accordingly, the supreme court referred the
case to a reference judge drawn from the trial bench for the purpose of
developing the facts. 3
At the reference hearing, the judge accepted the factual submissions,
testimony, and exhibits of each of the parties. The judge wished to avoid
committing the supreme court to the legal theory of either party; hence,
he did not rule on the relevancy of the evidence. 4 At the close of the
*Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Of Counsel to the plaintiffs in
Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, the Washington school finance case.
I The foregoing details are taken from the complaint in Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v.

Kinnear, Civil No. 42352 (Wash. Sup. Ct., filed Apr. 2, 1972).
2 WASH. Sup. CT. R. 1-58 (1969).
' Order of Referral, per Hamilton, C.J. (Aug. 7, 1972).

4 With reference to the parties' exhibits, the trial judge "heard and denied all objections to the
exhibits based on relevancy and materiality." Findings of Fact, No. 7, Northshore School Dist. No.

417 v. Kinnear, Civil No. 46166, at 4 (Wash. Super Ct., Mar. 23, 1973) (hereinafter cited as Findings
of Fact].
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hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact. An extensive debate
ensued. On March 23, 1973, the judge certified the findings of fact to the
supreme court. Briefs were filed and the case was argued before the supreme court in June of 1973.
I
THE FACTUAL SETTING

5

Washington's pattern of school finance and organization is fairly typical.

The state has 320 school districts, the boundaries of which are set by a
statutory mechanism. 6 District size ranges from 5 pupils in the smallest
district, to 70,000 in the largest. The total number of pupils in the system
is approximately 750,000.
The state prescribes certain standards, 7 within which each district determines its own educational program. Financing is a joint venture involving state, federal, county, and local funds, although federal and county
funds represent a relatively small proportion of the total funding pack8
age.
State monies are appropriated annually and distributed to school districts on the basis of a weighted pupil formula.9 These funds are equalized
in the sense that each district receives a sum sufficient-when added to
eighty-five per cent of an assumed 14 mill levy in the district-to equal the
state guaranteed level of $365. In addition, the state levies a 2 mill property tax in each district, which revenues are returned to the district to be
used for school purposes. 10 Finally, certain district costs are partially
reimbursed by the state, for example, ninety per cent of approved transportation costs. 1
Local funds are produced principally by a property tax. A basic uniform 14 mill local levy is required to qualify for the state guarantee
funds; special levies above that are voted by the electors in the district
to provide additional school funds. Because of the substantial reduction
in the percentage of state support in recent years,' 2 and the relatively
5 All data presented herein are as of the date of the 1972 hearing. The figures available at that
time generally referred to the school year 1971-72.
6 WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.57 (1970). See Findings of Fact, No. 8.
See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.03.030, 28A.04.120 (1970).
The relative state/local contributions for 1961 and 1970 respectively were:
1961
1970
State
62%
49%
Local
22%
35%
Findings of Fact, No. 41.
9 WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.41.140 (1970). The number of pupils in a district are "weighted"
for formula purposes in terms of such factors as the number of vocational class hours, staff experience, number of children from tax exempt homes or institutions, number of culturally disadvantaged children, and so forth. Findings of Fact, No. 16. The state average weighting factor
for 1973-74 was 1.5999. See Memorandum of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, June,
1973.
10Ch. 216, § 1, [1969] Wash. Laws 1624.
11 Findings of Fact, No. 17.
12 See note 8 supra,
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low level of the state guarantee, there has been significant growth in
the use of special local levies. In 1957, some $10 million in special levies
were voted; by 1972 this figure had grown to $172 million.13
This increasing reliance on locally generated funds means that the size
of a district's tax base is of major importance in determining the revenue
generating capacities of the district. 14 It also means that unevenness
in the statewide distribution of district tax wealth will have major consequences for educational funding. Per pupil tax base variations among
the state's school districts are substantial, ranging from a low of $1,925
to a high of $776,567 per pupil. In districts with more than 2,000 pupils,
the range is from a low of $8,464 to a high of $87,467 per pupil. Within
the metropolitan Seattle area, valuations range from a low of $8,757 to
a high of $35,393 per pupil.15
The combination of heavy reliance on local levies and substantial tax
base disparities makes equalization through state grants of special importance. Equalization based 'on the per pupil guarantee described above,
however, falls short of full equalization in several respects. Included in the
guarantee level are several features which benefit richer districts. Thus,
the fifteen per cent bonus paid to - each district (as a result of deducting
only eighty-five per cent of the local 14 mill levy to determine the amount
of state money needed to reach the guaranteed level) is a percentage
figure multiplied by the amount the district raises with its basic 14 mill
levy. Obviously, wealthier districts raise more with their 14 mills, and
thus receive a larger increment in bonus dollars, though the percentage
remains the same. 6 The same can be said for the 2 mill state levy
returned to the districts. These mills are levied on the property of the districts and thus produce more dollars per pupil in districts with higher
7
1

tax bases.

In addition to these mathematical examples of non-equalization, there
are practical features in the system which undermine equalization.
For example, the weighted pupil formula provides greater weight for pupils
in districts hiring more highly trained and experienced personnel. To the
extent that wealthier districts are better able to compete for staff with
greater training and experience, they are rewarded by a larger state
grant.' 8 Similarly, the feature of the plan which reimburses districts for
ninety per cent of transportation costs is likely to have a non-equalizing
effect. Wealthy districts can more easily incur the non-reimbursable part
of transportation costs and hence will qualify for larger amounts of the
reimbursable costs.1 9
13 Findings of Fact, No. 38.

14The trial judge found that "above the per-pupil guarantee, the major factor in determining
the amount of money that a school district can raise for education is the district's assessed valuation
per pupil." Id., No. 59.
15
Id., No. 19.
18
Id., No. 27.
7
' 1d., No. 28.
1 Id., No. 29.
Id., No. 30. This kind of situation would appear to call for a variable matching provision similar
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The most significant non-equalization occurs, of course, above the state
guarantee level. If the state guarantee were set at a level near the median
cost of educating a pupil, the foregoing aspects of non-equalization would
not be so troublesome. But the guarantee is set at only $365 per pupil,
while the statewide average cost of education is $721 per pupil. 20 Districts therefore must rely on special levies to produce a very substantial
part of their school dollars, and special levy dollars are not equalized:
with a given tax sacrifice, what a district can raise is purely a function
of its taxable wealth. In Northshore, the trial judge found that the low
level of the state guarantee compelled reliance on special levies, 21 and
that sixty-two per cent of local revenues came from special levies.2 2 The
average amount raised through special levies was $252.46 per pupil. 23
The system as a whole, then, is substantially non-equalized, despite
attempts by the state to provide some equalization through the allocation
of state aid. Wealthier districts
do have a decided advantage in the
24
generation of school dollars.
II
THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Standing of the School Districts
As part of its general motion to dismiss, the state attacked the standing
of the school districts, urging that municipal corporations are not competent
plaintiffs to attack the constitutionality of state statutes. Plaintiffs responded,
citing recent United States Supreme Court decisions which have substantially
broadened the concept of standing.2 5 All that is now required is that a
plaintiff show that there has been an injury in fact and that he is arguably
within the zone of interests protected by the statutory or constitutional
provision at issue. 26 Injury in fact to the plaintiff school districts was
shown by the substantial sums of money of which they were deprived by
the present system, by the inability of the district officers to meet their
to that used in some federal grant programs. See, e.g., 1 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FISCAL BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 138 (1967).
20 Findings of Fact, No. 33.
21
1d., No. 34.
22
Id., No. 40.
23

Id., No. 43.

24 The arguments concerning whether increased expenditures affect school quality produced

the usual inconclusive testimony at the hearing. The trial judge found that "there is no recognized
or acceptable exact standard for measuring the quality of education a child receives," id., No. 58,
but that "financing is a key ingredient to the provision of educational services." Id., No. 62. Plaintiffs'
brief proceeded on the assumptions that increased spending produces increased educational
quality, and that increased educational quality significantly affects educational achievement.
The same assumptions were made in a recent study of the problem. See R. REISCHAUER & R.
HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 3 (1973). The author of this article shares these assumptions.
25
See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970).
26 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
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sworn obligations to provide adequate school programs in their districts,
and by the management costs imposed by the present system-costs incurred by reason of delay and uncertainty in future funding, and which
include the difficulty of long-range planning, the distortion of choice
among programs with different time/revenue characteristics, the increased
cost of programs which would benefit from long-term purchasing, and the
inability to evaluate programs which cannot be operated evenly over
adequate time periods.
As to whether the districts were arguably within the zone of protected
interests, plaintiffs urged that whatever the ultimate meaning of that remarkably ambiguous notion, 27 it would be unreasonable to interpret the
phrase to deny standing to a school district in a school finance case since
the district, far from being a peripheral party, is at the vortex of the entire
financing system.
Several recent Washington cases involving similar claims by municipal
corporations, in reaching a decision on' the merits, implied that standing
was not an insuperable obstacle. 28 Moreover, recent decisions in other
states seem to be moving in the same direction. Municipal corporations
have been permitted to raise constitutional challenges on the theories that
the opposite result would be an abdication of judicial responsibility, 29 that
issues of great public importance should be settled, 30 and that standing
is ultimately a question of discretion for the court. 31 Finally, the result
seems consistent with the United States Supreme Court's most recent ref32
erence to the issue.
The state supreme court, after argument, denied the state's motion to
dismiss the school districts for lack of standing, with leave to reargue the
question when the case was presented on the merits. The practical effect
of the ruling was to permit the plaintiff school districts to continue supporting the litigation with funds and services, at least until the case
was decided on the merits.
B. Constitutional Provisions
Plaintiffs' constitutional attack on the existing school finance system
was originally based on both the federal and state constitutions. However,
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez,3 3 which
was handed down as briefs were being prepared, the case was presented
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 711-22 (Supp. 1970).
28 Moses Lake School Dist. v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wash. 2d 551, 503 P.2d 86
(1972); Snohomish County Bd. of Equalization v. Department of Revenue, 80 Wash. 2d 262,
493 P.2d 1012 (1972); City of Kirkland v. Steen, 68 Wash. 2d 804, 416 P.2d 80 (1966).
29 Ducharme v. City of Putnam, 616 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318 (1971).
30 School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967); Jersey
City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 111 N.J. Super. 50, 367 A.2d 64 (1970); Associated Hospital Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wisc. 2d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961).
31 Wachusett Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Erickson, 353 Mass. 77, 228 N.E.2d 62 (1967).
An especially well reasoned opinion is San Carlos School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 258 Cal.
App. 2d 317, 65 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1968).
32 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968).
33San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
27
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solely on state constitutional grounds.
The relevant provisions of the Washington state constitution dealing with
education are as follows. "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without
distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex. '34 "The
legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools." 35
The governmental structure contemplated by these provisions is quite
clear-responsibility for public education is emphatically lodged in the
state. Education is made not merely a duty of the state, but the paramount
duty. The duty is expressly defined to include all the children of the state;
it is met only where "ample provision" for education is made, and then
only when the delivery system for educational services is "general and
uniform."
1. Has the State Made Ample Provisionfor Education?
As might be expected, attempts to define "ample provision" at the
hearing produced no consensus. The judge found only that the state's own
contribution to educational funding "did not provide sufficient funds to
operate the public schools of the state of Washington." 36 According to the
trial court's findings of fact, the state's contribution represented only
forty-nine per cent of the cost of operating schools throughout the state. 37
State grants made up only a portion of the $365 guarantee, while the
average cost of educating a child in the state was $721.38 It was clear,
indeed, that in many districts the state's own minimum standards could not
be met with state grants alone even when the grant was supplemented
by revenues from' the basic 14 mill local levy. 39 Moreover, the state's
share of the costs of education had been growing relatively smaller each
year, dropping from 61.9 per cent in 1960-61 to 49 per cent in 1970-71.40
State expenditures for education had been falling steadily as a percentage of the total state budget as well. 41 The level of the state guarantee
had risen only 16 per cent since 1966, while local levies to meet
rising school costs had risen 275 per cent over the same period. 42 Based on
34 WASH. CONsT. art.

IX, § 1.

35Id. §2.
36 Findings of Fact, No. 33.
37
See note 8 supra.
38 Findings of Fact, No. 33.
39Id., No. 35.
40Id., No. 10. The following table represents the judge's finding of fact with regard to sources
of revenue.

Source
1960-61
1965-66
1970-71
Local Property Taxes
22.7%
24.8%
35.97%*
County Real Estate Excise Tax
3.5%
3.6%
2.71%
Federal Funds
5.0%
7.5%
6.40%
State Funds
61.9%
58.0%
49.00%
*Includes 2 mills shifted from local collection to state collection in 1968 which accounts
for 4.59% of the revenues in 1970-71.
41 STATE

BOOK
42
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42-43 (1972).
Id.at 99.
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these figures, the judge concluded that "the state apportionment has not
43
kept pace with rising school costs."

None of this was disputed by the state. Its position was, nevertheless,
that the use of local special levies met the "ample provision" requirement. There are several ways in which amplitude might be reached in a
system making use of local supplementation. On the one hand, if the
state guarantee was set at a realistic level-somewhere near the average
cost of educating a child-it could be argued that ample provision had
been made. Local levies beyond that level could be regarded as local
options to provide more than an ample education. On the other hand, the
state might provide no grant at all, leaving the provision of education revenues
entirely to the districts. If those districts had adequate taxing resources, and
if their capacities were relatively equal, it would be arguable that ample provision had been made by the state. In effect, the power to determine what is
"ample provision" would have been delegated to local units. Subject to state
minima, local taxpayers could decide for themselves what was "ample provision" on the bases of their tastes for education and their willingness to bear
the appropriate tax burdens.
The system which exists in Washington, however, follows neither of
these models. The judge found that by setting the state guarantee at such
a small percentage of the actual cost of education, the state had forced
local taxing units to rely on local supplementation. 4 4 The state thus left
the task of determining what is "ample provision" for education largely
to the local unit. But since the local districts have such disparate taxing
capacities, 45 the system cannot produce an accurate register of local tastes
and willingness to sacrifice.
The judge accepted the obvious fact that "school districts with low
assessed valuation per pupil can match the spending levels of districts
with high assessed valuation per pupil only with greater millage rates.""46
It followed that "districts with lower assessed valuation per pupil have more
of a burden in reaching a given level of per-pupil expenditures. '4 7 The
additional burden includes the higher taxes paid in the poor districts, 48
as well as the greater risk of voter rejection of a higher levy. 49 Both burdens
would appear to introduce distortions which make the system unacceptable
as an accurate register of local tastes and willingness to sacrifice.
The effects of these special burdens are not difficult to identify. The
evidence showed that richer districts tended to spend more per pupil
than did poorer districts, although the significance of the correlation varied
with different samples. When the system was viewed as a whole, there was a high
correlation (.85) between district wealth and per pupil spending, 50 suggesting
"I Findings of Fact, No. 32.
44Id., No. 34.
43
Id., No. 19. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
"' Findings of Fact, No. 20.
4
Id., No. 60(a).
41Id., No. 61 (b).
49 Id., No. 42.
50 Id., No. 51.
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that seventy-two per cent of all differences in spending were predictable from,
or attributable to, differences in district wealth. A sample of the 158 largest
districts (which contained ninety-five per cent of the school population)
showed a lower correlation (.27), explaining only seven per cent of the
variations.51 Analysis of a sample comprised of all districts enrolling more
than 2,000 pupils showed that the ten richest districts in the sample spent,
on the average, $148 more per pupil than the ten poorest districts in the
52
sample.
Despite their variations, all these correlations are positive, suggesting
the not very startling fact that spending is always easier when one has
the funds. This positive correlation casts doubt on the accuracy of spending figures as a register of local taxpayer tastes. In fact, per pupil expenditure data may well understate the amount of the distortion. In the sample
noted above containing all districts enrolling more than 2,000 pupils, the
average difference in spending between the ten richest and ten poorest was
$148, itself a significant difference. 53 In addition, the poorer districts taxed
themselves much more heavily-at a rate of 14.7 special levy mills as
against a rate of only 9.7 special levy mills in the richer districts. 54 Had
these poor districts had the average tax base of the ten richest districts,
it is possible that the taxpayers would have retained the 14.7 mill tax
rate and thereby achieved a spending level well above that of the
richer districts. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether bringing
the poor districts up to the tax base level of their richer neighbors would
have resulted in more educational spending or in lowered taxes in the
poorer districts. But given this kind of showing of the willingness of the
poor districts to bear heavy tax burdens for education, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that spending levels in poor districts could surpass those
in rich districts if their taxing capacities were fully equalized.

"1Statistically, the amount of variance between the assessed valuation per pupil and
the basic expenditure per pupil for the largest 158 school districts which contain 95% of
the children of the State is expressed by the correlation coefficient of .27. The correlation
coefficient squared gives the proportion of variance in one variable, predictable from, or
attributable to, variation in the other. .27 squared equals approximately .07. Thus, 7% of
the variance in basic expenditure per pupil is attributable to variance in the assessed
valuation per pupil, if the group of 158 districts is selected. Hence, for the 158 largest
school districts which contain 95% of the pupils in the state, the amount of variance statistically between the assessed valuation of property per pupil in a school district and the basic
expenditure per pupil is low.
Id., No. 52.
52 Id., Nos. 49, 50. The growing literature on this question seems in accord with the Washington
situation: a generally positive correlation of district wealth and spending, with the strength of
the correlation varying with the sample chosen. See, e.g., Berke, School Finance and Inequality of
Educational Opportunity, in J. BERKE, A. CAMPBELL & R. GOETTEL, FINANCING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY: ALTERNATIVES FOR STATE FINANCE 1, 5-10 (1972).

53 The trial judge included in his findings the following observation:
Relatively small differences in per pupil expenditure levels can have substantial effect
on educational programs. For example, for two school districts with equal student populations of 10,000, a difference of S100 in per pupil expenditure levels means that the higher
spending district is spending $1,000,000 more on its educational programs for the same
number of students.
Findings
of Fact, No. 57.
5
4Id., No. 49.
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Since the state chose not to make ample provision for education from
its own contributions, but rather compelled reliance on local supplementation, the state in effect chose to incorporate taxpayer tastes and
willingness to sacrifice in its definition of what constitutes "ample provision" for education. But the system permits an accurate register of taxpayer tastes only in the richer districts. Taxpayers in such districts can

make provisions that are ample. Taxpayers in poorer districts can achieve
only what is possible. The constitutional command of amplitude would not
appear to be satisfied when ample provision is made for only some of
the state's school children. By its terms the constitution requires that
ample provision be made for all children residing within its borders.
2. Is the Education System "General and Uniform"?

This consitutional language is repeated in a number of state constitutional provisions concerning public education, 55 but has received only
cursory judicial interpretation. 56 In analyzing the phrase, two extremes
should be avoided. On the one hand, the phrase cannot be read literally
to require a perfectly uniform educational system, although one might

define uniformity in such a setting. 57 Educational costs can be expected
to vary from one area to another, as can educational needs, and the entire educational context will vary from one part of the state to another
with the result that exact equivalency of educational programs would
be neither desirable nor acceptable.
On the other hand, the phrase "uniform and general" must not be
diluted to the extent that it requires only a general similarity in the
mechanical aspects of the school system. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court recently observed that Arizona school systems met the
constitutional requirement of generality and uniformity because
the legislature has provided for a means of establishing required courses,
qualifications of teachers, textbooks to be used in common schools, and qualifications of professional nonteaching personnel.... The legislature has also
provided statewide a general and uniform method for establishing schools
in every county.58
Surely, more than this is required by the constitutional mandate. Under
such a restricted view of generality and uniformity a court is precluded
from looking at the possibly differential effects of state requirements, so
long as the requirements are generally applicable. Such an interpretation
" See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 2-(I); ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
" For an annotated compilation of constitutional provisions, see OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND SELECTED LEGAL
MATERIALS RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1973).

" One of the embarrassments with the term "uniformity" is its unclear referent. Is a uniform
educational system one in which a uniform number of dollars is spent per pupil? Or a uniform resource input in real terms? Or a uniform output in terms of educational achievement? Or a uniform

tax burden on the taxpayers? See generally W.
EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION (1959).

NEWHOUSE,

CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND

' Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973).
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could mask significant discriminatory treatment so5 9 long as the discrimination occurred in the same manner in every district.
Analytically, the phrase "general and uniform" is a compound formula.
The notion of generality would seem to require like treatment of citizens
except where a rational justification supports different treatment. The idea
of uniformity is a correlative one, requiring like treatment of citizens within
the rational classification drawn. As one court has put the matter:
A law is general and uniform... in its operation when it applies equally to

all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided that
such class is founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it.60
As thus formulated, uniformity and generality requirements would seem
to merge almost indistinguishably into orthodox equal protection analysis,
which is often framed in similar language. Indeed, doubt has been expressed as to whether such state constitutional provisions are needed at all,
given the substantially identical reach and meaning of equal protection doctrine.6 1 The same question must be put under either formulation of the legal
standard, and the answers are apparently judged by the same criteria.
The first analytical task is to identify the kinds of formal and practical
classifications which are created by the system; the second is to examine
the adequacy of the justifications asserted, if any, for the differential
treatment which results. Three kinds of differences would seem to be
created by the educational finance system under review. One is easy to
justify, another is controversial, and the third seems to have no justification
at all.
The first kind of difference results from attempts to provide differential
resource inputs in an effort to equalize educational outputs. Under the
per pupil guarantee formula described above, districts will receive more
per pupil dollars to the extent they have higher percentages of secondary
school pupils, vocational programs, children from institutions, culturally
disadvantaged children, and the like. Each of these types of students has
cost consequences, and the differential provided by the state is in part
an effort to assist districts in meeting those higher costs. There has never
62
been any argument in principle over this kind of differential treatment;
clearly, a system does not lose generality and uniformity by taking into
account differing costs of providing a given service. Indeed, it is arguable
that failing to take such differences into account might deprive a system
of the requisite generality and uniformity.
The second kind of difference needing justification occurs by reason of
the decentralization of a significant portion of the money-generating process.
59 Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), in which the Supreme Court construed the failure
of the San Francisco school system to deal with language deficiencies of Chinese-speaking students
to be a violation of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
60 Coelho v. Truckell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 47, 53, 48 P.2d 697, 700 (1935).
61 Matthews, The Function of ConstitutionalProvisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L.J.
503, 516-19 (1950).
62 However, there may conceivably be argument over what factors should be included and what
weightings they should receive.
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In such a fiscally decentralized school system, it is possible for children in
two districts to be treated differently from an educational resource point of
view if the taxpayers in the respective districts have significantly different
tastes for education or significantly different feelings as to the size of the local
tax burden. Can such differences be justified under a constitutional mandate
of generality and uniformity? Today, opinions on this question vary sharply
according to one's assessment of the relative importance of the two values
in conflict-equality and local control of funding levels. Public education in
the United States has historically favored the values of local control over those
of strict equality. Most systems today permit local taxpayers to determine to
some extent the level of educational resources which will be committed to the
public schools. Such decentralized decisions concerning funding levels have
been the subject of approbation in the public finance literature, where one
finds the argument that aggregate utilities are maximized if small, homogeneous
units of local government are permitted to determine service levels generally.03
Even those who most ardently desire reform of the present systems of school
finance have made persuasive cases for the continued-indeed,
renewed-pri64
macy of local control as against strict equality.
Current discussions about school finance, however, have heightened sensitivities to the consequences of inequality, and impressive arguments are now
being advanced that inequality is too high a price to pay for local control. The
Fleischman Commission in New York, for example, concluded after elaborate
study that permitting variation of educational resources as a function of local
taxpayer tastes was undesirable.6 5 The prestigious Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations has likewise advanced the view that essentially
full state funding of public schools is desirable in the interests of equality, even
at the price of eliminating significant amounts of local control of funding
levels. 6" The argument has even been advanced that variations in educational
67
service levels as a function of local taxpayer tastes is morally unjustifiable.
Whatever one's predilections with regard to this controversy, it would
seem safe to conclude that permitting local variations as a function of local
tastes for education and tax burdens is at least rational, and therefore not
defective under generality and uniformity provisions. It would seem unlikely
at this late date in the history of American public education that a court would
rule that a state legislature was no longer competent to select the values of
local control over strict equality if the legislature chose to do so.",
The third kind of differential treatment which requires justification is
'3 For

reference to the relevant literature, see R. BISH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METRO-

POLITAN
AREAS
64

61(1971).

J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

14-20 (1969).

65 NEw YORK STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION, REPORT ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND
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that which flows from differences in local district wealth. 69 A preliminary
question is raised by language in some United States Supreme Court decisions
indicating that this kind of difference does not require justification under
the equal protection clause and hence, under the parallel analysis presented
here, would likewise not require justification under state constitutional generality requirements. The usual cases cited in support of such a proposition are
McGowan,70 Salsburg,71 and Griffin.7 2 Citing these three cases, the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez said that it "has never found in the Equal Protection Clause
The Court elaborated:
any per se rule of 'territorial uniformity.' ,,73
It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to
nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the
upon the relative wealth
burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending
74
of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.
The Court's language suggests that differences which are ultimately geographical are immune from constitutional attack. It is doubtful if the cited
cases support such a broad principle. In Salsburg, the Court carefully observed
that the territorial differences permitted were not substantive,7 and that no
other constitutional values were transgressed. 76 While the Court did say that
the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the legislation is not with the
state,7 7 that is a far cry from saying that under no circumstances need the state
rebut a prima facie showing of irrationality. In fact, one commentator has
concluded that
[tihe Salsburg opinion indicates that if a petitioner can show a sufficiently serious
detriment to himself, and make a prima facie showing that there is no rational
distinction, the state may have to come forward and support
basis for the state's
78
its classification.
Similarly, in McGowan, territorial variations were permitted, but only on
a finding by the Court that they were not invidious.7 9 This can hardly be taken
as a dismissal of any obligation to show a rational reason for the distinction.
Finally, in Griffin, the Court in fact struck down a territorial difference because the state could not justify it. While the opinion rested on a racial classification, its broader message has been said to be that when an individual is
"prejudiced in an important way by 'state action' which distinguishes between
localities for no apparent reason.., the equal protection clause sensibly repurposes of analysis, it is important to keep this kind of difference separate from that
control
just discussed. Failure to do so blurs opinions such as Rodriguez. In the real world,
of local
the two forms of differences are dissimilar, even antithetical.
70 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
71 Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
72 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
73411 U.S. at 54 n.1l0.
7
4 Id.at 54.
69 For

75 346 U.S. at 550. See Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public
Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.G.L.A.L. REv.

787, 791 (1968).
76 346 U.S. at 553.
77Id.
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HARV. L. REv. 890, 894 (1968).
U.S. at 427.
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quires the state to rebut the inference that it has acted arbitrarily."8°
Moreover, the very fact that uniformity and generality requirements have
been expressly applied to the provision of educational services by the state
constitution can only mean that justifications for substantial differences must
be provided by the state. The language can have no other meaning. It would
be pointless to make it the paramount duty of the state to provide a general
and uniform system of education and then to hold that massive and systematic
differences in the treatment of citizens need not be justified by the state.
Whatever may be the meaning of "territorial diversity" with regard to other
locally produced services, it would seem that in the provision of educational
services, the state is under a special duty to explain any substantial differences
in its treatment of citizens.
One searches in vain for any justification for educational service level variations which derive from tax base disparities. There is obviously no justification in terms of differing educational needs, costs, or contexts. Differences
flowing from tax base disparities are wholly random as far as educational consequences are concerned. If a district has special educational problems or
costs and a high tax base, it is wholly fortuitous and not the result of any deliberate state policy.
The conventional justification for these variations is that permitting them
furthers the state's interest in local control of school funding levels. It is too
late in the day, however, to deny that the present system distributes genuine
local control very selectively. If local control is an objective a legislature is
permitted to further, it is so because there is thought to be value in permitting
local taxpayer tastes to govern the level of educational services to be provided.
But genuine choice about spending levels cannot be equally available in a system
marked by substantial tax base disparities. In poorer districts, taxpayers make
a fair assessment of neither their interests in education nor their willingness
to bear tax burdens. In such districts, the real choice is between inferior schools
on the one hand and near-confiscatory tax rates on the other. To regard the
variations in spending levels which result from such a system as indications
of taxpayer tastes is blindness. For example, in the Seattle School District,
taxpayers produced $392 per pupil with an 11.09 mill tax effort.8 1 In the
adjacent Federal Way School District, taxpayers taxed themselves more than
twice as heavily (24.2 mills) but could produce only $211 per pupil.8 2 It is
simply unrealistic to suppose that the funding levels accurately represent the
relative assessments about the value of education in these two districts. If the
system cannot be justified as a fair technique for articulating local choice, it
has no basis in reason at all.
The United States Supreme Court, in Rodriguez, found that the Texas
system was rationally related to a legitimate state. purpose,83 and a thoughtful
80 81 HARV. L. REV. 890, 895 (1968).

81 Findings of Fact, No. 44.
82 The
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state court might hesitate before arriving at a contrary result. But there are
a number of reasons why the question need not receive the same answer in
state court litigation. Perhaps the most important difference is that the Supreme
Court had to answer the question on a very general level. Its decision would
have an immediate and drastic impact on the school finance systems of fortynine states, and the decision would have to be made without intimate familiarity
with the political and economic history and conditions of those states. Moreover,
the Court faced the prospect of becoming involved in some degree of supervision of these varied and far-flung educational systems. Faced with such a
question, it is not surprising that the Court would choose to defer to local
judgments concerning reasonableness. The opposite result would have conarea of federal-state relations, a
stituted a bold step into a highly complex
84
fact of which the Court was plainly aware.
In the much less complex setting of a single state, such judicial modesty
is unnecessary. A state court, familiar with the history of public education
in the state, with a sense of the political and economic trends in the state, with
access to detailed data about the local finance system, and without responsibility for the rest of the United States, could be expected to examine more
critically a justification advanced for deprivations of the magnitude demonstrated on the record in a case such as this.
One concern expressed by the Rodriguez majority was that an affirmance
might open the door to arguments that all locally produced services must
be fully equalized.8 5 That issue need not concern a state court interpreting
a constitutional provision such as the one under consideration here. It is only
education that is made the paramount duty of the state; no other service is
expressly made subject to the generality and uniformity requirements of the
constitution. Therefore, a holding on the validity of the educational finance
system would not necessarily dictate the outcome of future cases dealing with
the provision of other services.
As part of their effort to show the irrationality of the system, plaintiffs
developed data on the effect of the system on the poor in the state. The median
family income, the percentage of families with less than $5,000 income, and the
percentage of families with incomes of more than $15,000 for each district
were derived from census data. 86 When correlated across the state, there proved
to be no significant relationship between district wealth and personal wealth.
This system-wide lack of correlation can probably be explained by the averaging
process involved, for there were significant negative correlations in the state's
urban centers, and significant positive correlations in the rural areas of the
state. Thus, in largely urban King County, rich districts with high property
values tended to have higher concentrations of poor people, 87 while in largely
84

Id. at 44.
8- Id. at 37.
86These data are collected in Appendix A of Petitioner's Brief.
87

King County (18 districts)

9 Richest Districts
9 Poorest Districts

Percentage of Families
With Less Than $5,000
Income
11.6
8.2

Percentage of Families
With More Than $15,000
Income
27.7
35.4
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rural Yakima County, the poor were concentrated in low property-wealth
districts. 88
Some significant tendencies appeared in selected samples.8 9 Those districts
with the highest relative concentrations of poor people (districts with more than
thirty-five per cent of the families with less than $5,000 income) had average
district wealth substantially less than the state average. While tax effort in
these districts was close to the state average, the amount of special levy dollars
raised per pupil was well below the state average.
Whether the poor in Washington could be identified with sufficient precision to constitute a constitutional "class," and whether the effects of this system
could be said to injure them as a class, 90 it seems clear that for many of the state's
poor the system imposes substantial special burdens. And the imposition of such
burdens, with respect to a service as critical to the poor as is education would
seem the essence of irrationality. The poor who live in poor districts can neither
supplement their children's education, move to wealthier districts, nor increase
taxes to reach spending levels of richer districts. For all the subtle difficulties
in measuring the extent of this problem, its reality cannot be denied. It is
further evidence of the elemental irrationality of the system.
In summary, the financing system in the State of Washington seems to
lack the requisite generality. The groupings of districts into rich and poor,
and the differential treatment of taxpayers and children in those districts
seem unrelated to any legitimate state purpose. This differential treatment
can be seen in poor districts with low spending levels, where the absence of
taxable wealth imposes a direct burden on school children. It can also be seen
in poor districts with relatively high spending levels, where the absence of
taxable wealth imposes special burdens on the taxpayers. Even where the burden appears to fall mostly on the taxpayers, educational deprivations are
highly probable; as has been indicated, it is possible that such educationoriented taxpayers would have provided more educational resources for their
88

Yakima County (15 districts)

Percentage of Families
With Less Than $5,000
Income

Percentage of Families
With More Than $15,000
Income

8 Richest Districts
7 Poorest Districts

27.2
33.5

12.0
10.9
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State Average
16 Districts with at least 30%
Families with less than $5000
Income

Assessed
Valuation
Per Pupil

Special Levy
Tax
Effort

Special Levy
Dollars per
Pupil

$19,980

12.6 mills

$252.46

$15,547

10.0 mills

$146.39

5 Districts with at least 35%
Families with less than $5000
10.0 mills
S 95,23
S 9,137
Income
90 Rodriguez imposes such conditions for a suspect classification of wealth in order to invoke
the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review. 411 U.S. at 18-29. For a thoughtful analysis
of this issue, see Clune, Wealth Discrimination in School Finance, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 651 (1973).

WASHINGTON

children had additional district wealth made these resources obtainable at
the same tax price.
3. Does the System Deprive Citizens of Privileges and Immunities?
The Washington Supreme Court has equated the state's privileges and
immunities clause 9 with the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. 92 Accordingly, the court has utilized the equal protection analysis developed in decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Generally, when reviewing a state-created classification, the court inquires to determine whether
93
the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. However,
when the classification is drawn in terms that are constitutionally suspect, or
when the classification affects a fundamental interest, a stricter standard of
judicial review is employed. The state act is presumptively invalid and "the
its [action] is necessary to the accomplishburden is upon the [state] to show that
94
ment of a compelling state interest."
As previously indicated, the rational basis test of equal protection is essentially identical to the analysis used in determining generality and uniformity
as discussed above. 95 The additional question here to be explored is whether a
stricter standard of review is appropriate in this case and, if so, whether the
system as described fails to meet that stricter test.
Plaintiffs urged that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez answered both questions affirmatively. According to Rodriguez, the
inclusion of education in the list of fundamental interests is required if "there
96
is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
Since the right to education is expressly laid down in the Washington constitution, it would seem that, for state constitutional purposes, education is a
fundamental interest and infringements of that interest should therefore
invoke the stricter standard of review.
Moreover, the majority opinion in Rodriguez made it clear that systems of
the kind under review here could not pass the strict scrutiny test. The Court
said:
If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's
system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather
than the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the State
must demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision,"
and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected
system
the "less drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, the Texas financing
97
and its counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster.
91 "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens or corporations." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
'2 "[Tlhe equal protection clause of the U.S. CONST., amend. 14, and the privileges and immunities clause of [the Washington] CONsT. art. I, § 12, have the same import and we apply them
DeFunis v. 'Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 37 n.16, 507 P.2d 1169, 1185 n.16 (1973).
as one."
93
1d. at 26, 507 P.2d at 1178.
94
Id.
11 See text at p. 375 supra.
97 411
96

U.S. at 33-34.

d. at 16-17.
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Plaintiffs therefore concluded that the Rodriguez decision mandates both
that the educational finance system be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard and that it could not meet the obligations imposed by that standard.
III
THE DECISION OF THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT

As this article goes to press, some fourteen months after the case was
finally argued before the Washington court, a decision by that court has yet
to be rendered. Delay in reaching decision in difficult cases can always be expected, especially when there is likely to be some division on the court. This
much delay, however, is difficult to justify and there can be no question that
the delay itself imposes substantial costs on the managers and regulators of
the existing school finance system in Washington who, while the litigation
remains unsettled, are effectively precluded from taking steps to reduce or
eliminate any of the inequities which have been exposed.

